Schrems II put the data transfer behind the contract

Schrems II invalidated Privacy Shield and made standard clauses conditional on an assessment of each transfer. Software suppliers needed to account for overseas access as well as the promises in their contracts.

The European Commission's Berlaymont headquarters in Brussels, with a blue European flag banner at the centre of its facade.
European Commission's Berlaymont headquarters, Brussels.EmDee (opens in a new tab) · CC BY-SA 4.0 (opens in a new tab)

A European customer could sign a data processing agreement with a software supplier and still have an unresolved international transfer. An overseas support provider might inspect a customer record; a subprocessor might maintain a database from another country. Those operational details became central after the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its Schrems II judgment on 16 July 2020.

The judgment invalidated the EU-US Privacy Shield adequacy decision while leaving the Commission's standard contractual clauses decision valid. Young software companies could still use a familiar contractual route, provided the promised protection worked in the circumstances of the transfer. Procurement teams had to examine the operation of those safeguards alongside the signed document.

Two legal results arrived together

Privacy Shield had supplied an adequacy framework for covered transfers to participating US organisations. The court found that the protections assessed in that decision did not meet EU requirements. Its explanation addressed limits on access by US public authorities, the proportionality of surveillance programmes and the absence of sufficiently effective judicial redress. Those legal protections extended beyond what a commercial recipient could promise.

Standard contractual clauses survived because the mechanism contained duties to verify protection and to suspend transfers when the clauses could not be honoured. The court required protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU. The assessment had to consider both the agreement and relevant aspects of the destination country's legal system. A contract between two businesses could not itself bind that country's public authorities.

The transfer hid inside ordinary operations

The European Data Protection Board's FAQ, adopted a week after the judgment, clarified its practical reach. The FAQ warned that giving an overseas processor or subprocessor remote access could constitute a transfer, including access for administration. Controllers needed to understand whether their processors and subprocessors transferred personal data for storage or maintenance. A claim that the application used a European cloud region therefore answered only part of the customer's question.

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Microsoft headquarters, Building 92, Redmond, Washington.Coolcaesar (opens in a new tab) · CC BY-SA 4.0 (opens in a new tab)
What a hosting statement leaves unresolved

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ComparisonSupplier statementTransfer question
StorageThe production database is in the EEAWhere can administrators access personal data?
SupportThe application uses a regional deploymentDo support records move into a separate overseas service?
SubprocessorsThe direct supplier has signed clausesWhich onward transfers have been authorised and assessed?

The EDPB FAQ addressed processor access and onward transfers. Hosting data in a regional deployment alone did not resolve either question.

A startup needed to follow a record into support tickets, debugging tools and outsourced services wherever those systems received personal data. It needed to identify who could access each copy and from where. Engineers, vendor managers and lawyers all had work to do: an assurance about location could not be dependable if the team handling incidents routinely overrode it without a record.

Contracts needed an operational answer

The EDPB said there was no grace period for continuing to rely on the invalidated Privacy Shield decision. For transfers using standard clauses, exporters and importers had to assess the circumstances and any supplementary measures. If appropriate safeguards could not be ensured, the transfer had to be suspended or ended. Supervisory authorities also had enforcement duties where exporters had not stopped transfers that could not meet the required protection.

A concrete data center complex with ventilation grilles, rooftop equipment and tall exhaust stacks behind a perimeter fence.
CAMPUS data center, Frauenfeld, Switzerland, 2022.Kecko (opens in a new tab) · CC BY 2.0 (opens in a new tab)
From transfer inventory to an operating decision
  1. Identify

    Locate the personal data, recipients, access paths and destination countries.

  2. Assess

    Examine the transfer mechanism, circumstances and relevant destination law.

  3. Evaluate measures

    Determine whether additional safeguards can make the required protection effective.

  4. Act

    Proceed only on a valid basis; suspend or end a transfer when protection cannot be ensured.

A practical sequence based on the court's explanation and the EDPB FAQ. It is not a substitute for assessing a particular transfer.

The initial guidance left technical questions unresolved. The EDPB was still analysing which additional legal, technical or organisational measures could help. A supplier could examine restricted access, different processing arrangements or encryption, but no named control automatically cured every legal deficiency. Whether a service needed readable personal data remained an important design constraint.

A smaller supplier had two cost decisions

The first decision concerned the product. Separating customer environments, reducing unnecessary personal data in logs or limiting overseas support access could require substantial work. Those changes might also make a supplier's answers more consistent across customers. Each deployment needed a realistic allowance for recurring legal and engineering effort; a compliance badge gave little indication of that cost.

The second concerned the operating model. A regional service can bring additional staffing, monitoring and recovery costs. A vendor that promises local administration must be able to support customers when the regional team is unavailable. Investors evaluating that promise would need to connect the proposed architecture to service commitments and gross margins. The judgment created no guarantee that customers would pay enough to cover those costs.

Consent was not a universal escape route

Article 49 derogations remained possible when their conditions applied. The EDPB stressed that consent had to be explicit, specific and informed about the transfer's risks. Relying on contractual necessity required objective necessity and occasional transfers. These provisions could not simply become the routine foundation for every recurring software operation. The judgment nevertheless left lawful routes for transfers to the United States when the relevant conditions were met.

The movement of data and the people with access to it needed to be established before selecting the legal basis. Customers could then examine which service performed the processing, what protection it provided and what would change if that arrangement became unsupportable. Those answers belonged in deployment design as well as in the contract.

Investment implications

  • Map overseas administration and subprocessors alongside the location of stored customer records.
  • Standard clauses required an assessment of each transfer; their continued validity did not automatically validate a particular transfer.

Sources

  1. Press release No 91/20: Judgment in Case C-311/18 (opens in a new tab)

    Court of Justice of the European Union

  2. Frequently Asked Questions on the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-311/18 (opens in a new tab)

    European Data Protection Board

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